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Natural Theology Reconsidered (Again)1 
Russell Re Manning 
Bath Spa University, UK 
 
 
‘Nothing is more disastrous for the theologian himself and more despicable to 
those whom he wants to convince than a theology of self-certainty.’2  
 
 
I. Introduction: Reconsidering Natural Theology (Again) 
 
In this article I propose to have another look at the very idea of natural 
theology and, more specifically, to reconsider (again) the vexed question of its 
apparent demise. I shall also, by way of conclusion, say something about the 
future of natural theology, the prospects for which are, I think, far from as 
bleak as is commonly believed. 
In brief, my argument will be that neither what I shall call the ‘traditional’ nor 
the ‘revisionist’ accounts of the nature and fate of natural theology are 
adequate to the task of explaining the peculiar trajectory of its history and, in 
particular, the consensus view of its apparent terminal decline since its 
alleged ‘heyday’ in the original series of Boyle Lectures established by Robert 
Boyle’s benefaction of 1691. 
To anticipate my main contention: I want to suggest that the fundamental 
reason behind the seeming eclipse of natural theology in the modern era was 
the increasing ‘specialisation’ of Christian theology in the attempts, 
characteristic of the 19th and 20th centuries, by theologians to establish an 
unambiguous subject matter for theology: initially through the notion of faith 																																																								
1 This article is a revised version of a talk with the same title delivered as the 2015 Boyle 
Lecture at the Church of St Mary-le-Bow, City of London on 25 February 2015. I am grateful 
to the Convenor, Dr Michael Byrne and the Trustees for the kind invitation to deliver the 
lecture and to the Revd George Bush and The Worshipful Company of Grocers for the 
warmth and generosity of their reception. I am also grateful to Dr Louise Hickman, Newman 
University, Birmingham, who gave an insightful response to the original lecture. 
2 Paul Tillich, ‘The Theologian’ in The Shaking of the Foundations (London: SCM Press, 1949), 
p.125. 
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and subsequently through that of revelation. It is, I propose this quest for 
disciplinary purity that proved fatal for the inherently ‘impure’ enterprise of 
natural theology – namely that of looking to nature to speak of God. The 
conviction of modern theology that it be primarily – indeed exclusively – 
about religion or about God’s own self-revelation is, I propose, incompatible 
with the idea – crucial to the vibrancy of natural theology – that knowledge of 
God is not restricted to one specific domain – be it religion or revelation – but 
is available, in some form or another, to all simply on the basis of their 
experiences of the world they find themselves in. 
 
But I am getting ahead of myself. Before setting out my ‘more revisionist’ 
intervention into the historiographical question of the apparent rise and fall of 
natural theology and its epistemic authority (by which I simply mean 
whether its claims to knowledge are taken seriously or not), I want to take a 
step back and say a few words about the origins of natural theology as a style 
of thinking, or better perhaps, as a way of seeing the world and the ‘whispers 
of divinity’ therein. In so doing, I also hope to define my terms more clearly 
and to give an indication as to why the question of its alleged eclipse is of 
more than narrow academic interest.  
The fate of natural theology matters, I venture, in the bluntest terms, because 
natural theology represents such a fundamental – and dare I say, natural – 
human attitude. Recent work drawing on cognitive science and evolutionary 
psychology confirms what my argument from the history of ideas suggests: 
natural theology and its central arguments have an intuitive appeal that is 
hard to resist, even if it is conceded that the arguments lack persuasive 
power. 3  Natural theological arguments rarely persuade or convince as 
standalone pure philosophical arguments. Instead, natural theological 
arguments seem to express intuitive convictions that the operations of human 
intellect and the ways the world seems to be to us as we encounter it are not 
merely self-contained but rather tell us something, however imprecise, 																																																								
3 See Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt, A Natural History of Natural Theology. The Cognitive 
Science of Theology and Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014). 
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uncertain and incomplete about ultimate reality, or, God. That such a basic 
human impulse is thwarted by the consensus orthodoxy of the illegitimacy of 
the natural theological enterprise – or at least its ghettoization within the 
confines of academic philosophy of religion – is, to say the very least, a recipe 
for tragic alienation and an open invitation to all forms of dogmatism and 
sectarianism, both religious and non-religious. 
What I the evidence of this empirical work confirms is that natural theology is 
not – and should never have become – an independent type of theology (or 
philosophy) supposedly self-sufficient and wholly distinct from other forms 
of theology. Such a thought of the autonomy of natural theology is 
encouraged by the standard approaches to natural theology, approaches that 
start out with a stark either/or opposition between natural and revealed 
theologies – a contrast that I contend has been especially harmful to the 
proper estimation of the character and ambition of natural theology. 
 
II. The Three (or Four) Types of Theology 
 
Typical of this approach is James Barr’s definition, taken from the first page of 
his 1993 book, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: 
 
‘Traditionally, “natural theology” has commonly meant 
something like this: that “by nature”, that is, just by being 
human beings, men and women have a certain degree of 
knowledge of God and awareness of him, or at least a capacity 
for such awareness; and this knowledge or awareness exists 
anterior to the special revelation of God.'4 
Barr’s definition is uncontroversial in the literature – the only interesting 
thing about it being that he includes women in the enterprise of natural 
theology (not, regrettably, something to be taken for granted). Barr is clearly 
referring to the long-established tradition of defining natural theology against 
so-called 'revealed theology'. This approach is typically developed in terms 																																																								
4James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 1. 
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(already indicated by Barr's title) of the contrast between the 'two books': 
nature, the book of God's works, is the subject of natural theology whilst the 
book of God's words – Scripture – is the subject of revealed theology. The 
two, the implication seems to be, are different disciplines with different 
source material and an autonomy one from the other; they may or may not 
come to similar conclusions, they may, or may not, be given equal standing 
and the one may be anterior to the other, but we must never in Francis 
Bacon's words, 'unwisely mingle or confound these two learnings together.' 
After all, as we have all been primed to ask: 'what has Athens to do with 
Jerusalem'?5 Significantly however, Bacon marked a radical departure from 
the established practice of hermeneutical theology in his estimate of the 
'difference between the visible marks that God has stamped upon the surface 
of the earth, so that we may know its inner secrets, and the legible words that 
the Scriptures, or the sages of Antiquity, have set down in the books 
preserved for us by tradition'. Previously, as Foucault puts it, 'the truth of all 
these marks – whether they are woven into nature itself or whether they exist 
in lines on parchments or in libraries – [was] everywhere the same: coeval 
with the institution of God.’6 An important consequence of the Baconian 
'sharp distinction' between the knowledge yielded by the interpretation of the 
two books is that it becomes possible to define natural theology against 
revealed theology in such a way that the two are presented as separate and 
non-overlapping disciplines, which then stand in some sort of relation one to 
the other – be that complementary or antagonistic. 
This natural/revealed contrast has firmly established itself as the essential 
starting point for an understanding of the character of natural theology. It is, 
however, not a helpful point of departure. By contrast, an historical approach 
to defining natural theology suggests instead that natural theology is best 
defined not as a body of knowledge distinct from the systematic reflection 
upon revelation but as an attitude or way of thinking about the divine that 
can take its place alongside other theological attitudes. In this sense, what 																																																								
5Tertullian, Heretics 7. 
6Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: an Archaeology of the Human Sciences 2nd edn. 
(Routledge, 2001). 
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marks natural theology out from other forms of theology (other attitudes to or 
ways of thinking about God) is not so much the source of its knowledge of the 
divine but rather the manner of the thinking and a sense of what the point of 
that reflection is.7 
To make a little more sense of this suggestion, let me turn, for a moment, in 
Werner Jaeger's words, to 'the origin of natural theology and the Greeks.'8 As 
Jeager puts it: 
 
 'the speculations of the pre-Socratics about the Divine 
displayed a decided singleness of character in their intellectual 
form, despite their diversity of aspects and the multiplicity of 
their points of departure. Their immediate goal was the 
knowledge of nature or of Being. The problem of the origin of 
all things was so comprehensive and went so far beyond all 
traditional beliefs and opinions that any answer to it had to 
involve some new insight into the true nature of these higher 
powers which the myths revered as “the gods”. '9 
 
He continues to affirm that 'if we ask upon what this new evaluation is based, 
we find that the real motive for so radical a change in the form of the godhead 
lies in the idea of the All (to olon, to pan).'10 As a result, nothing finite or 
limited has 'any right to the title of divinity': a thought that in turn leads to 
the first stirrings of natural theology. Natural theology, then, in this original 
sense is not simply 'talk about the gods' but the struggle to say anything at all 
fitting to the true nature of the divine. Crucially, however, this struggle did 
not take the form of an abstraction away from finite things but instead that of 																																																								
7 For a collection that attempts to engage the breadth of natural theology from a variety of 
perspectives (historical, religious, philosophical, scientific, and aesthetic-cultural), see Russell 
Re Manning, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Natural Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
8Werner Jaeger begins the 1947 published version of his 1936 Gifford lectures, The Theology of 
the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1947) with the claim that the book might 
well have had this alternative title. 
9Jaeger (1947), 172. 
10Jaeger (1947), 173. 
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an engagement with nature; it is, Jaeger declares, a 'fact that whenever the 
Greeks experienced the Divine, they always had their eyes on reality.'11 
Physics, metaphysics, and theology belong unavoidably together and it is 
precisely this holistic, inclusive, synthetic (impure) attitude that is 
characteristic of that approach of natural theology that Jaeger describes as 'a 
specific creation of the Greek mind': 
 
 'Theology is a mental attitude which is characteristically 
Greek, and has something to do with the great importance 
which the Greek thinkers attribute to the logos, for the word 
theologia means the approach to God or the gods (theoi) by 
means of the logos. To the Greeks God became a problem.'12 
 
This problem of God raised by the pre-Socratic concern for the absolute lies 
behind the classic distinction between three types of theology: mythical, 
physical, and civil. Augustine reports this distinction, which he attributes to 
the first century BC Roman writer Marcus Terentius Varro, although it is clear 
that this is a distinction that Varro himself derives from a well-established 
Greek tradition.13 Augustine cites Varro's description: 
 
 'They call one kind of theology fabulous (mythicon), and 
this is chiefly used by poets; another natural (physicon), and this 
is used chiefly by philosophers; another civil (civile), and this is 
what the people in the various countries use.... 
 As to the first of the three I mentioned, there are in it 
many inventions that are inconsistent with the dignity and the 
true nature of the Immortals. Such are the tales that one god was 
born from a head, another from a thigh, another from drops of 
blood, that gods have been thieves, and adulterers, and have 
been slaves of men. In a word, herein is attributed to the gods 																																																								
11Jaeger (1947), 173. 
12Jaeger (1947), 4. 
13Augustine, City of God, VI.5. 
	 7 
everything which might be attributed not only to mankind, but 
to the most degraded of mankind.... 
 The second is that on which the philosophers have left us 
many books, wherein they discuss the origin, dwelling-place, 
nature, and character of the gods: whether they came into being 
in time or have existed from all eternity: whether they are 
derived from fire, as Heraclitus believes, or from numbers, as 
Pythagoras holds, or from atoms, as Epicurus supposes; and so 
on with other theories, the discussion of which is more easily 
tolerated within the walls of a lecture-room than out of doors in 
public.... 
 The third sort is that which it is the duty of citizens in 
states, and especially of those who are priests, to know and to 
put into practice. From this we learn what gods are to receive 
public worship and from whom; what sacrifices and what other 
rites are to be performed and by whom.... 
 The first sort of theology is best adapted to the theatre (ad 
theatrum), the second to the world (ad mundum), the third to the 
state (ad urbem).'14 
 
Augustine censures Varro for succumbing to the pressures of a social 
conformity in his endorsement of civil theology in spite of his obvious (to 
Augustine at least) inclination towards the natural; for his own part, 
Augustine himself is unequivocal: 
 
 'Some gods are natural, others established by men; and 
concerning those who have been so established, the literature of 
the poets gives one account, and that of the priest another – both 
of which are, nevertheless, so friendly the one to the other, 
through fellowship in falsehood, that they are both pleasing to 
the demons, to whom the doctrine of the truth is hostile.... 																																																								
14Augustine, City of God, VI.5. 
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 So then, neither by the fabulous not by the civil theology 
does any one obtain eternal life…..Both are base; both are 
damnable.'15 
 
To put the contrast slightly differently (and less polemically), we might 
identify the three different types of theology described by Varro as indicating 
three alternative attitudes towards the task of theology. The point of mythical 
theology is to tell stories of the gods; it has an educational function in 
preserving the narratives of a particular religion tradition. What is important 
to note here is that in spite of the creative and imaginative character of this 
poetic theology, its primary purpose is to re-tell or re-narrate an established 
or given set of stories. This is theology as repetition. By contrast, the purpose 
of civil theology is resolutely practical; its aim is to maintain the pax deorum 
and to ensure that the institutions of the state reflect their divine origins. Civil 
theology is political and moral theology; it is as Hobbes put it 'not philosophy 
but law.' As such it is important to note that the primary concern of such a 
theology is with the secular and its primary purpose is to regulate human 
affairs in accordance with an established religious tradition.  
Against both these intentions the aim of natural theology – the theology of the 
philosophers – is rather in a sense simply to be concerned about God. This 
concern, or worry, about God is, in an important respect, gratuitous. Natural 
theology is concerned about God for its own sake – simply because the 
attempt to think about God compels and invites free and unconstrained 
reflection. God is an irresistible problem for thought. At the same time, of 
course, this sense of natural theology is in Varro's terms best adapted to the 
world; God is of concern because the thought of God is unavoidable to the 
philosopher – or indeed, anyone – seeking to make sense of her world and her 
place in it (including a twenty-first century scientific naturalist). Such a 
natural theology is the culmination of a philosophical engagement with 
reality, an engagement that transcends reductive naturalism in the ventured 
hope that, in the words of the Cambridge Platonist John Smith, ‘the whole of 																																																								
15Augustine, City of God, VI.6. 
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this visible universe be whispering out the notions of a Deity.’ Yet, as Smith 
continues, ‘we cannot understand it without some interpreter within,' 16 
namely human reason, or logos – that disclosive power that gives confidence 
that these speculations whilst always risked and never finally accomplished 
are nonetheless not in vain, but rather transformative and even in some sense 
redemptive. And yet, we should be wary of an over-hasty conclusion that this 
is pure human reason, unaided and autonomous. 
As a further speculation here, I suggest that a fourth type may usefully be 
added to this tripartite scheme of mythic, natural and civil theology. For want 
of a better term, I shall call this type 'faithful or pistic (pisticon) theology'.17 By 
this type of theology, I want to indicate what might be called the theology of 
the believers; it is, to follow Varro's formula, best adapted to the church (ad 
ecclesia). This theology is above all dogmatic or creedal; its aim is to explicate 
the contents of a religious tradition. In contrast to the mythical type of 
theology, this is not simply a repetition but an exegetical attitude best 
encapsulated in Anselm's famous 'motto' of 'faith seeking understanding.' Of 
course, this type of theology is often described precisely as 'natural theology' 
– from Anselm's aim in the Proslogion 'to prove in a single argument the 
existence of God, and whatsoever we believe of God' to Aquinas’ admission 
that the proposition 'God exists' 'is not self-evident to us; but needs to be 
demonstrated by things that are more known to us' to name the two most 
obvious examples.18  However, The key distinction that I want to make 
between this type of theology -faithful theology- and that which Varro 
designates as natural theology lies in the goal of the respective approaches. 
Faithful theology takes as its starting point a certain definition of God and 
aims through its analyses to remain true to its initial assertion; natural 
theology by contrast has no dogmatic starting point from which to begin and 
																																																								
16John Smith, ‘Discourse Of the Existence and Nature of God’ in Select Discourses (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,1859), p. 129. 
17 For an earlier version of this typology, see Russell Re Manning ‘A Perspective on Natural 
Theology from Continental Philosophy’ in Re Manning, Oxford Handbook, 262-275, 265-268. 
18 Anselm, ‘Preface’ to Proslogion in The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the 
Proslogion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: 
Benziger Brothers, 1946), 1.2.1. 
	 10 
which serves to constrain (or perhaps better contain) its reflections, instead on 
this view natural theology is better characterised as the search for a definition 
of God, a quest which it knows can never and will never be fulfilled. In this 
sense, far from natural theology, what might result from an engagement with 
the natural from the perspective of a faithful theology would be a ‘theology of 
nature.’19 
My central contention in raising this fourth type of theology is that faithful 
theologies are, from the outset undertaken on the basis of a commitment to a 
certain ecclesiology, rather than from a commitment to “revealed” as opposed 
to “natural” sources of their theology. Another way of putting this, echoing 
Martin Heidegger, is to characterise this approach as a “positive” theology, 
where the positum – i.e. the “what is given for theology” – is not primarily 
revelation, but faith. As Heidegger puts it in the course of distinguishing is 
own philosophy from theology: 
theology itself is founded primarily by faith, even though its 
statements and procedures of proof formally derive from free 
operations of reason.20 
This is, of course, not to deny the philosophical sophistication or rigour of 
Anselm or Aquinas (or of their successors in “philosophical theology”) – far 
from it. However, it is to suggest that this approach entails a significantly 
different estimation of the character and role of philosophy for theology. At 
the risk of overstating the contrast, it is instructive to be reminded of Bertrand 
Russell's gloriously allergic conclusion to his discussion of Aquinas in his 
History of Western Philosophy: 
 There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He 
does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever 
the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an enquiry, the 
result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he 
begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is 																																																								
19 This relates to, but crucially reformulates Ian Barbour’s influential distinction between 
‘natural theology; and ‘theology of nature’ in Ian Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and 
Contemporary Issues (New York: Harper, 1997). 
20 Martin Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ in John D. Caputo (ed.), The Religious 
(Blackwell, 2002), p. 57. 
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declared in the Catholic faith….The finding of arguments for a 
conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special 
pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a 
level with the best philosophers of either Greece or of modern 
times.21 
Russell is, of course, undoubtedly mistaken in his dismissive view of Aquinas' 
engagement with philosophy as a kind of 'pick and mix' exercise of 
opportunistic self-justification, combined with smug dogmatic indifference. 
He is also wrong in his denigration of Aquinas' philosophical acumen. But, he 
does have an important point: Aquinas' starting point is not that of the 
Platonic Socrates, who begins in awe and wonder knowing nothing and 
whose philosophical journey culminates in the achievement of a natural 
theology of learned ignorance. Aquinas’ point of departure is rather that of a 
faithful believer, whose sacra doctrina aims to treat 'all things...under the 
aspect of God’ and which itself is subalternated to God's own knowledge of 
himself.22 To return to my previous distinction: whereas natural theology is in 
search of God, striving towards a definition of God, faithful theology is the 
attempt to understand a God already in some sense known (and certainly 
known to himself), it aims to expound upon its received and adhered to 
definition of God. Bertrand Russell is correct in as much as it does seem clear 
that Aquinas and the Platonic Socrates do have different estimations of the 
scope and ambition of philosophy within theology; this difference is partly, I 
suggest explained by my distinction between 'faithful' and 'natural' 
theologies. 
 
III. From the ‘traditional’ to the ‘revisionist’ Histories of Natural 
Theology 
 
Moving from Aquinas to the modern era, it is, I suggest, the fate of modern 
theology to have increasingly become dominated by my fourth type of 																																																								
21Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (Routledge, 1946,1961), 453-4. 
22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1.1.7 
	 12 
theology alone, to the exclusion of any other. Indeed, if any other type of 
theology is permitted at all it is on the condition that it be subordinated to the 
primacy of theology as faithful response. Exceptions, of course, prove the rule 
and the recent interest in ‘theopoetics’, for example may be a sign that the 
iron grip of theological positivism is loosening – as hopefully, is the rise of 
revisionist proposals for natural theology. However, for such a possibility 
truly to be realised I argue that a ‘more revisionist’ interpretation of natural 
theology is required. And further, that such a project must start with a 
reconsideration of the historical question of the supposed rise and fall of 
natural theology as the early modern period gave way to the epoch of late 
and the post-modernity. It is to this latter question that I now turn. 
 
Just as is the case in the science-and-religion debate more generally, we first 
have to deal with a persistent – if patently false – ‘traditional’ narrative of the 
inevitable waning of natural theology in the face of the unremitting progress 
of scientific naturalism and the atheism that is said to stem from it. According 
to this Whiggish view of scientific progress at the expense of theological 
superstition, early-modern natural theology emerged in the wake of the 
scientific revolution as a short-lived and misguided reception of the new 
experimental empirical science by religious believers naïve to its full 
implications. Encapsulated in the famous remark attributed to LaPlace, 
slowly but surely the scientists simply had no need of the hypothesis of God 
and thus the days of natural theology were always numbered, not 
withstanding the initial impetus given to the project by the works of such 
‘priests of nature’ as Robert Boyle himself. Inevitably, the great hero of this 
account is Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution by natural selection 
provided the definitive rebuke to the last lingering wishful thinking and 
natural theological naivety, helpfully collated in William Paley’s flawed 1802 
compendium, Natural Theology. 
 
Fortunately, this simplistic and clearly ideologically driven traditional 
narrative has rightly been exposed as fraudulent myth-making, notably of 
	 13 
course, by the 2010 Boyle Lecturer, John Hedley Brooke – even if, sadly, it 
persists in the public imagination, along with the broader conflict thesis of 
which it is a part.23 I do not intend here to recount the catalogue of this 
traditional view’s deficiencies; instead I want to pay attention to one of the 
most influential ‘revisionist’ accounts that aims to place the rise and fall of 
natural theology in a far more nuanced story of the origins of modern atheism 
and the eclipse of theological authority. I refer here to the work of the 
intellectual historian Michael Buckley.24 In short, Buckley argues that early-
modern natural theology emerged as a deliberate attempt by Christian 
theologians to respond to what they perceived as the dangers of a putative 
atheism taking shape in the burgeoning natural philosophy.  
 For Buckley, early modern natural theology represented an attempt by 
Christian theologians to outflank any potential atheistic natural philosophy 
by taking it on on its own terms and ‘occupying’ – and thereby neutralising – 
its distinctive epistemic authority. Unfortunately, the irony of the story for 
Buckley is that precisely by aping the natural scientists the theologians in 
effect abandoned their own particular, native, if you will, grounds of 
authority. By adopting the norms and criteria of the natural philosophers the 
theologians evacuated their own – properly religious – grounds of any 
authority. From such honest but misguided attempts to outplay the scientists 
at their own game the legitimacy of distinctly theological argument was lost 
and the modern situation of default atheism was born. 
For Buckley, the lesson is clear: theology must abandon its aspiration to get 
the better of atheistic natural philosophy – theology should have no desire to 
become scientific; such a legitimatory tactic is bound to fail. Not because of 
the inevitable superiority of science over theology, but simply because the 
dice are unavoidably loaded. Theology just cannot become philosophy 
without ceasing to be theology. Like a cricket team endeavouring to prove 
their superiority over a rugby team by playing – and obviously losing – a 																																																								
23 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion. Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
24 Buckley’s argument is most comprehensively developed in his At the Origins of Modern 
Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 
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game of rugby, so natural theology is a doomed enterprise – never truly 
natural nor truly theology. Instead, for Buckley, theologians ought to 
summon up the courage of their convictions and return unapologetically to 
their own indigenous roots – a task that has recently been taken up with gusto 
by the adherents of so-called ‘radical orthodoxy’. 
In many ways Buckley’s argument reprises the analysis offered by David 
Hume in his posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.25 
There Hume ridiculed the efforts of the natural theologians, represented by 
the character of Cleanthes and instead concluded that theological speculation 
ought to be governed by faith. As an hypothesis God fails miserably to satisfy 
the demands of scientific enquiry, resulting ironically in the triumph of the 
‘careless scepticism’ of the character Philo. The moral of the story then – 
fearlessly ignored by Dawkins et al, in spite of their professed great esteem for 
Hume – is that God fails as an hypothesis precisely because God is not an 
hypothesis: God does not/cannot explain anything in scientific terms and 
hence if that is what natural theology is then it is obvious that it will soon 
enough whither and die. 
 
IV. Towards a ‘More Revisionist’ History of the Rise and Fall of 
Natural Theology in Modernity 
 
However, and here I turn to my own ‘more revisionist’ account, unfortunately 
for them both Buckley and Hume fundamentally misrepresent the natural 
theology over whose funeral they preside. Far from the disciplinary purity 
envisaged by such definitions of natural theology as that offered by James 
Barr, the natural theology of the original series of Boyle Lectures, for instance, 
by no means stood in opposition to its supposed poetic, civil, or indeed 
‘faithful’ rivals; but rather frequently moved from one to another without any 
noticeable anxiety. In some sense, indeed, it is questionable whether the 
natural theology typical of this period is in fact ‘natural’ theology at all, for it 																																																								
25 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. And Other Writings, ed. Dorothy 
Coleman. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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repeatedly violates the disciplinary strictures and is as much concerned with 
revelation as it is with nature. Instead, in their different and non-homogenous 
ways, the original Boyle Lecturers may rightly be considered as the heyday of 
modern natural theology in their joyful promiscuity with regard to ways of 
thinking about God – and in some of the rather radical conclusions that such 
speculations led them to. What unites the Boyle Lecturers – and early-modern 
natural theology more generally – and what does, afterall, make them 
exemplary instances of natural theology is their insistence on the inadequacy 
of any particular ‘essence’ of Christianity – be that the experimental natural 
philosophy or the ‘book learned’ Scriptural and ecclesial traditions.  
What brought this strand of natural theology to its apparent end, then, was 
not, I suggest, its inappropriate mimicking of the epistemic authority of the 
emergent natural philosophy, but rather an alternative loss of nerve. Rather 
than holding fast to the plural and multi-disciplinary vision of natural 
theology as the inherently unstable enterprise of seeing more in nature than 
nature alone, panicked by the apparent threat of atheism (the rumours of 
which were greatly exaggerated in the early modern period – as they always 
tend to be), the theologians looked instead for certainty and the single-
minded security of an essentialist approach to theology that identified 
theology with systematic reflection on religion and/or revelation.  
Natural theology appears to fail, in my argument, because it got crowded out 
by various quests for theological purity, with the result that it is only those 
exclusivist forms of natural theology – i.e. those that affirm (precisely against 
the grain of the wider tradition of natural theology) that reason (or science) 
alone can suffice to provide knowledge of God without any reference to other 
sources –  that are recognised (and condemned) as such. In other words, 
natural theology became reduced to those atypical forms that construed it as 
concerned with, as it were, epistemic access points to God, such that the 
persistence of the heirs to the broader tradition of Varro’s theology of the 
philosophers went unrecognised. As such, Karl Barth’s aversion to natural 
theology is well-founded; if the only legitimate form of theology is faithful 
theology as a response to the clearly circumscribed ‘positum’ (or subject 
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matter) of God’s self-revelation in Christ, then understandably any claims to 
alternative sources of knowledge of God are to be resisted in the strongest 
possible terms.  
In this sense, Barth’s antipathy towards natural theology is equally shared by 
his supposed adversary, the ‘Father of liberal theology’, F. D. E. 
Schleiermacher. Whereas Barth’s ‘Nein!’ to any prospect of natural theology is 
justly famous, Schleiermacher’s identification of theology with systematic 
reflection on the Christian faith (theology as Glaubenslehre) is equally 
dogmatic in its rejection of the messy uncertainty of open-ended natural 
theology. And this in spite of Schleiermacher’s heroic work in translating 
Plato into German and insisting on the importance of the aesthetic for 
theology. Ultimately, however, for Schleiermacher, theology is to be 
subordinated to faith, such that the ‘father of liberal theology’ seems to have 
had more in common with that most dramatically ‘faithful’ of the 19th century 
theologians, Soren Kierkegaard, than he did with his contemporary, great 
rival and proponent of a synthetic form of natural theology, G. W. F. Hegel. 
But: before we disappear down the rabbit hole of German philosophical 
theology, I want to turn from its apparent demise to the strange persistence of 
natural theology after its official eclipse. 
 
V. The Strange Persistence of Natural Theology 
 
Throughout this article I have carefully qualified the language of the ‘rise and 
fall’ of natural theology in the modern era. I now want to be explicit: I do not 
accept that natural theology was fatally undermined, by the scientific 
revolution; nor indeed, as Buckley suggests, that it originated with the 
emergence of early modern natural philosophy. It is undeniable that natural 
theology was indeed side-lined in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as a result of the consensus turn to theological positivism in 
theology’s search for disciplinary purity. And yet throughout the same period 
natural theology’s epistemic authority remained largely intact: it just no 
longer appealed as the preferred option for the theologians, replaced instead 
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by the rise and institutional establishment of systematics or dogmatics as the 
truly theological discipline. 
Whilst marginalised, however, natural theology never really went away and 
continued to develop, frequently in some surprising situations. For example 
natural theologies are found in the works of the German Idealists, Hegel 
Schelling, and their English co-conspirator, S. T. Coleridge, as well as with the 
reforming theologians of Lux Mundi. That there was so much more to 19th 
century natural theology than our exclusive focus on Paley and the 
Bridgewater Treatises deserves far greater recognition.  Indeed John Henry 
Newman’s strident rejection of natural theology – as what he called a ’religion 
of inferences’ that turns ‘theology into evidences’ – is echoed by Coleridge, 
who condemned Paley’s misguided efforts to prove the existence and nature 
of God through an extended argument from design even as he advanced his 
own for of natural theology as part and parcel of his wider project of 
reanimating the Christian imagination of his time.26 
One further compelling example of the persistent yet transformed presence of 
natural theology late into the 20th century is Paul Tillich and his radical 
reformulation of the very task of theology away from dogmatics to what he 
called ‘theology of culture’. Whilst Tillich explicitly rejected any appeals to 
‘nature’ for his constructive theology, his reticence was not a rejection of the 
logic and aspirations of Varronian natural theology, but instead a (more) 
revisionist view of how best to characterise the world in which we live and 
through which we can come to knowledge of God. For Tillich, simply put, the 
world that we experience is that of historical existence and not merely nature 
as given to us by the sciences. Hence, Tillich’s call for a project of ‘theology of 
culture’ in which claims about God are to be made through normative 
cultural interpretation and not only through the systematic unpacking of 
doctrinal loci. In this sense then, Tillich’s theology of culture, even if it has 
little whatsoever to do with arguments to prove the existence of God – an 
enterprise that Tillich found ridiculous and not a little blasphemous – is one 																																																								
26 See Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion. Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of 
the Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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of the most developed natural theologies of the 20th century. Of course, Tillich 
also wrote a Systematic Theology and yet this fact hardly distracts from his 
basic allergy (characteristic of natural theologians) to all attempts to identify 
the subject matter of theology exclusively in anything specifically ‘religious.’27 
 
VI. Conclusion: The Prospects for Natural Theology 
 
In conclusion, I propose that it is with approaches consistent with Tillich’s 
displacement – or dis-location – of theology from its essentialist positivism 
that the future of natural theology will lie. As might be expected, I am not 
convinced that the prospects for natural theology are most likely to be 
fulfilled by either of the two academic specialisms most closely associated 
with the term, namely the philosophy of religion and the science-and-religion 
field. This is, of course, by no means to deny that there is interesting and 
important work to be further developed in both of these areas. But, both – at 
least in their currently dominant forms – tend to adopt overly restrictive 
conceptions of natural theology that would surely hinder its future, if it were 
only here that we looked for signs of hope.  
Philosophy of religion, especially in its majority anglo-american analytic 
strands operates with a radically constricted notion of natural theology that 
simply equates it with philosophical argument for the existence of God. A 
mere glance at the Table of Contents of the recent Blackwells Companion to 
Natural Theology, edited by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig suffices to 
confirm that its estimation of natural theology, whilst of some use in 
combatting aggressive philosophical naturalism, will do little to reinvigorate 
natural theology as the enterprise of contemplative speculation about God on 
the basis of our experience of the world we find ourselves in. 
Likewise, the contemporary consensus in the academic field of science-and-
religion offers little for the future enhancement of natural theology, albeit for 
different reasons. Increasingly, those working in science-and-religion seem 																																																								
27 See inter alia the essays in Russell Re Manning, ed., Retrieving the Radical Tillich. His Legacy 
and Contemporary Importance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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committed to a view of natural theology that permits it a place, but only on 
condition that it take that place securely within, and explicitly subordinated 
to, ‘faithful’ theology. Both 2014 and 2016 Boyle Lecturers (Alister McGrath 
and Sarah Coakley) are typical of this tendency.28 Whilst both have very 
different projects and reasons for recalling natural theology as part of their 
work, both also share a common insistence that any form of revived natural 
theology must be relocated within the orbit of systematic theology; a move 
that partly explains their shared conviction that any revived natural theology 
must be very different from its ‘Enlightenment’ or Paley-ite ancestor. What 
both overlook is precisely that the ‘antiquated’ forms of natural theology that 
they reject were only ever a minority strand within the broader tradition of 
natural theology and, indeed, one of the least representative of its nature and 
ambitions. 
So where might we look to discern indications of the future for natural 
theology? Following my earlier suggestion, I propose that it is to those whose 
work attempts to escape the exclusive dominance of ‘faithful’ theology – not 
out of impious iconoclasm – but rather out of a desire to liberate theology 
from an overly restrictive dependence on religion. To put this in more 
Tillichian terms, I find promise for the future of natural theology in that work 
for which the reach of the ‘theological circle’ is wider than any one particular 
religious tradition and that ranges inclusively across nature and culture and 
across religions without lapsing into mere description. I suggest that the 
future of natural theology will be the cautious and humble attempts to give 
voice to the whisperings of divinity in the world as we experience it. Neither 
autonomous of nor subservient to faithful theology, such a natural theology 
will aim to respond to the ‘rumour of angels’ (in Peter L. Berger’s famous 
phrase) that puts the lie to claims to the self-sufficiency of the natural and, to 
recall Tillich’s warning from my epigraph, the disaster of a theology of self-
certainty. 																																																								
28 See Alister McGrath, The Open Secret. A New Vision for Natural Theology (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2008) and Sarah Coakley, ‘Sacrifice Regained: Evolution, Cooperation and God’ 
2012 Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen, forthcoming from Oxford University 
Press, 2017. Their respective Boyle Lectures are available at 
https://www.gresham.ac.uk/series/the-boyle-lectures/. 
